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Since the demise of the USSR in 1991, the ﬁve Central Asian republics have joined a
number of international organisations, most notably the UN. However, while their mem-
bership in this organisation is often taken for granted and used by scholarship on Central
Asia as an example of their “race to membership”, few studies if none have addressed not
only how these state relate themselves to the organisation, but also how they behave in it
and what norms they support in it. By using the theoretical lenses of the English School
and by adopting a multi-method analysis based on qualitative and quantitative strategies,
this paper seeks to shed light on the normative stands of these states as expressed within
the General Assembly, on whether common positions and strategies exist and on what the
degree of their normative convergence is. Findings reveal that all Central Asian states
favour a Westphalian world order, that among them there is high convergence on pluralist
norms of international society, and that while their record of regional cooperation is poor,
they tend to agree on many issues at the international level.
Copyright  2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: the purpose of the study and its
hypotheses
Since the demise of the USSR in 1991, Central Asia has
been caught in two conﬂicting dimensions: victim of its past,
hostage of its future. The literature on the international re-
lations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistanllege London, Strand,
arch Center, Hanyang
vier
nter, Hanyang University. Prodand Uzbekistan1 has often discussed how the past of the re-
gion couldmark its future developments, how territorial and
inter-ethnic strives, silenced under Soviet rule, would affect
the intra-regional international relations in an explosive
mixture of chaos and disorder. By the same token, the future
of Central Asia has often been at the forefront of scholarly
research on the region: what will happen in future has been
the common question condemning Central Asia to a peren-
nial status of suspension in the international system: on the
edgeof, on thebrinks of, one step from(Akçali, 2003;Hashim
&Rashid,1992;Hyman,1993; Jones Luong&Wienthal, 2002;
Kleveman, 2003; Rashid, 2008). Very few academic works, if1 While I am aware of the multiple meanings that the term “Central
Asia” entails (see, e.g., Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014), this paper considers
“Central Asia” as speciﬁcally made up of the ﬁve former Soviet republics
listed in the text, thus following the conventional use found in the
literature on the region.
uction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Central Asian states have entered a world with not only
material structures and geopolitical imperatives, but
normative and institutional webs as well, where they had to
ﬁnd their place.
In fact, one of the ﬁrst actions these states did once in-
dependent was joining the United Nations (UN), both to
substantiate the de jure character of their independence
and to participate in the shaping of those norms and rules
that regulate and inform world politics.2 An analysis of the
international behaviour of the Central Asian republics is
still missing from the substantive literature on the region,
which has been more concerned with assessing interna-
tional inﬂuences on the region, rather than on how these
states “see” the international (see for example Jackson,
2010; Kavalski, 2012; Lewis, 2012; Warkotsch, 2007).
Thus, the ﬁrst purpose of this brief study is to ﬁll this lacuna
in the literature on the international relations of the Central
Asian republics.
A second aim of this study is to translate on the inter-
national dimension the cooperation–competition debate
that has characterised the literature on regional politics in
Central Asia. The literature on intra-regional relations has
always stressed, with undoubted merits, the basic un-
cooperative nature of Central Asian intra-regional re-
lations, highlighting patterns of disintegration and
competition, factors of de- if not of contra-regionalisation
(Allison, 2008; Bohr, 2004; Cooley, 2012: 149–153;
Libman & Vinokurov, 2011; Linn, 2007; Spechler, 2002).
Bitter disagreements over energy and water resources,
border delimitation and territorial disputes in the region
make even the most optimist analysts doubtful of sub-
stantive regional cooperation in the near future.
Yet, I believe that given their common historical legacy,
their common political background and the fact that the
physical, geographic system presents them with the same,
serious political, demographic and environmental chal-
lenges, at the international level there is more agreement
among them than within the region itself. This may be
explained by assuming that while at the international level
norms and rules are only professed and supported, within
the region decisions have to be taken, thus running the risk
of challenging personal interests and sovereign rights
(Collins, 2009).
Thus, the hypotheses that underpin this paper are the
following:
 H1: given their general condition as third-world coun-
tries (Abdullaev, 2002: 245; Ayoob, 1995) and their past
political, social and economic experiences, their
normative orientation in world politics is highly
convergent3;2 On March 2, 1992, all the ﬁve Central Asian states completed their
procedure of admission to the UN, being accepted as full members with
unanimous votes of the General Assembly at its 82nd plenary meeting.
3 By normative convergence I mean that condition in which a group of
states consider the same international norms and rules as the legitimate
ones in managing and conducting world politics, sustaining their validity
in a concerted way and reiterating their validity, necessity and impor-
tance in agreement with one another. H2: given their still incomplete process of state-building,
the norms endorsed by the Central Asian republics are
those typical of a pluralist, Westphalian inter-state
system;
 H3: given H1, Central Asian states have used the inter-
national stage to act in concert to address several
problems in their own region;
 H4: given H1 and H3, Central Asian states present
themselves as a coherent regional group in world
politics.
To verify these hypotheses, this paper sets the task of
analysing the present state of the behaviour of Central
Asian states within the UN, in particular within the General
Assembly (UNGA), thus in line with recent literature dis-
cussing “regional positionality” on international issues
(Bailey, Strezhnev, & Voeten, 2013; Burmester & Jankowski,
2013; Ferdinand, 2013; Hosli, van Kampen, Meijerink, &
Tennis, 2010; Häge & Hug, 2013; Luif, 2003; Strezhnev &
Voeten, 2013a).4
This is for multiple reasons. Firstly, all Central Asian
states are members of the UNGA, and therefore an exten-
sive analysis of their normative stances is possible.
Secondly, they are not member of the Security Council
or of other voting institutions; when this happens, such as
membership of Turkmenistan in the ECOSOC or of
Kazakhstan in the Council of Human Rights, the other
Central Asian republics are not represented, and therefore
an analysis of the whole group of states is not possible.
Thirdly, if the aim is to highlight and disclose the
normative orientation of Central Asian states in world
politics, shedding light on their attitude on normative is-
sues with respect to problems of world governance, then
the UNGA can be seen as the main arena where normative
positions are held, explained, contrasted and challenged
(Kim & Russett, 1996). As a global deliberating body, the
Assembly appears to be “well suited to discussing the
general principles and norms that do or should govern in-
ternational relations” (Peterson, 1986: 259). The delibera-
tive process of the UNGA is “a process of distributing
desired symbolic and material values among members of
society” (Peterson, 1986: 7).
Furthermore, considering the already noted trend in the
literature, votes in the UNGA have become “the standard
data source for constructing measures of state preferences
as they are comparable and observable actions taken by
many countries at set points in time” (Bailey et al., 2013: 1).
In sum, the UNGA, like all other international organisations,
is one of the elements that affect the process of world
politics by providing the norms and institutions within
which states and other actors interact in pursuit of their
various goals (Luif, 2003: 13; Peterson, 1986: 5). Even if (or
perhaps exactly because) resolutions are not binding, and
are rather indications, suggestions, manifestation of the
world’s Zeitgeist in a particular moment on a particular
issue of world politics, the vote and the justiﬁcation for that4 According to Strezhnev and Voeten (2013a), since 1998 almost 100
articles and papers have relied on voting data to construct preference
measures for states and their governments.
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a country, or a group of countries, abides by.2. The analysis of words and votes in the GA: a worthy
exercise?
In one of the best discussions of the utility of analysing
voting behaviour within the UNGA, Robert Keohane has
addressed the important point of supporting an analysis of
voting behaviour of states with the political processes of
negotiations and tit-for-tat behind the scenes to substan-
tiate the meaning of votes themselves (Keohane, 1967).
According to him, a single vote or group of votes cannot
speak for itself, and rarely are variables per se. More often, if
not always, votes within the UNGA are the output results of
endless negotiations, meetings, challenges, agreements
and disagreements in the rooms behind the curtain, where
states put on the table their cards and play according to
their will, whether following their mere interest (in sup-
porting, balancing on rejecting a given resolution) or
following a normative commitment: “Important as the
understanding of individual and group voting behaviour
undoubtedly is, such analysis does not provide us with
comprehensive knowledge of General Assembly politics”
(Keohane, 1967: 221; see also Kissack, 2007). His target
were those scholars who employed statistical techniques to
simply ﬁnd correlation between group composition and
voting outcomes, without being interested in why certain
groups supported (opposed) a given resolution or how that
support (opposition) was created and sustained.
On this point, I agreewith Keohane that amere binomial
correlation between states and votes does not demonstrate
much. This is why, for the purpose of this paper, I con-
ducted brief preliminary research to ﬁnd those press-con-
ferences and bilateral meetings where heads of states
stressed the need to continue to cooperate within inter-
national institutions and the UN in particular that may be a
sign of consultations and discussion on common positions
to adopt within the UNGA.5
In addition, this paper adopts the use of speeches and
declarations of political leaders as its method to give a
tentative framework of discussion and consultation where
to put the statistical component of voting behaviour in the
UNGA (see Section 7 and Appendix). This move can also
serve to reduce methodological biases deriving from5 References to coordination in international bodies (always at the
bilateral level in Central Asia) can be the following among others:
Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan (http://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-19809.
htm#sthash.uEwWgPLu.dpbs and http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/
uzbekistan/2063132.html?); Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (http://www.
uzdaily.com/articles-id-20046.htm#sthash.lIYQM9ry.dpbs and http://
www.inform.kz/eng/article/2566151?); Kazakhstan–Tajikistan (http://
www.avesta.tj/goverment/17553-e-rahmon-vstretilsya-s-glavoy-mid-
kazahstana.html); Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan (http://www.inform.kz/
eng/article/2462872?); Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan (http://en.trend.az/
regions/casia/kyrgyzstan/2111346.html?); Kyrgyzstan–Kazakhstan
(http://en.trend.az/regions/casia/kazakhstan/2092499.html?). I also came
to know about dialogue and consultation in UN bodies between Central
Asian states through personal communications with ofﬁcial Uzbek sour-
ces in Tashkent (interviews conducted by the author in Uzbekistan on 6th
November, 2013).“chance voting”, i.e. voting convergence driven by chance
rather than by coordination (Häge, 2011).
However, while Keohane focuses on impact, and on how
small states may inﬂuence the outcome of a resolution, in
this paper I focus more onwhat a vote in the UNGA signiﬁes
from a mere normative viewpoint. As a matter of fact, I
assume that to vote for a speciﬁc resolution or on a speciﬁc
theme is not only a reﬂection of a state’s interests, but it
may well represent a support/endorsement for a given
norm/rule in international relations as well. This is partic-
ularly true for small states and newly independent states,
which having the advantage of holding the majority in the
UNGA may oppose and contest norms that would hinder
their development, infringe on their sovereignty and
silence their cultural peculiarities. In sum, while the UNGA
“is not a comprehensive reﬂection of the full range of
foreign policy concerns of all states, or of the balance of
priorities of individual states, [.] voting cohesion there is
still a very good indicator of common positions on the
widest range of global issues” (Ferdinand, 2013: 3).
Since in this paper the stress is more on norms and rules
rather than on material capabilities and physical dynamics
of world politics and the intent is to show, to the extent that
it is possible, the normative convergence of Central Asian
states in the UNGA, I deem that to make use of English
School (henceforth ES) categories of international society,
pluralism, solidarism and institutions is a convenient move
to grasp the complexities of Central Asian behaviour in the
Assembly.
The ES maintains that states, although being in an
anarchic system of relations (Waltz, 1979), manage to
maintain order and stability among themselves adopting
common norms, rules and institutions6 that channel and
guide the behaviour of states, thus forming an international
society (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004). A society of states, how-
ever, can present itself in different facets, the main ones
being pluralist and solidarist. In a pluralist international
society, the common interests and values can be said to be
the Westphalian ones, i.e. the avoidance of any kind of
interference in domestic affairs, the territorial and political
survival, the maintenance of the state’s position as the only
legitimised subject of international law, the relatively
peaceful coexistence and the implementation of the mini-
mal degree of cooperation among the units in the system.
The basic rules deputed to make these interests and values
effective and preserved are, therefore, the reciprocal
recognition of sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention.6 Due to the limited scope of this paper, I cannot provide an extensive
discussion on the notion of institution as meant in the ES. It is sufﬁcient to
note that by institution it is meant durable but by no means eternal
codiﬁed practices which channel the behaviour of the states (or, in gen-
eral, political communities) forming the society, giving a sense of order
and predictability to their actions (Buzan, 2004: 181). The following may
be considered the pivotal institutions of contemporary international so-
ciety: sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, balance of power, war
and Great Powers management (Bull, 1977). Recent scholars focus also on
the market, nationalism and environmentalism (Falkner, 2012: 511–515;
Holsti, 2004). For a more detailed analysis, see also Linklater and
Suganami (2006).
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which the sovereign character of the units is deﬁned in a
more elastic way, therefore allowing for more substantial
cooperation in an enlarged number of ﬁelds, from the
economy to human rights, from a more substantial pro-
tection of the environment to common projects of political
convergence. The threshold that may be said to divide the
two conceptions of international society is the number of
norms and institutions shared by the actors and the impact
that these normative, behavioural prescriptions have on
the sovereign character of the units themselves (Buzan,
2004).
I decided to adopt this theoretical framework in this
paper because, as said, I mean to shed light on two related
aspects of Central Asian international politics: whether the
competitive nature of regional politics is reﬂected also at
the international level, and, if not, what the norms shared
among them are, whether pluralist or solidarist. The ES,
being a via media between realism and liberalism, allows to
focus on this relational, normative dimension of interna-
tional relations while not dispensing the non-cooperative
behaviour at the regional level. This would then
contribute to the literature on regional cooperation dealt
with in the introduction, as it would focus on a peculiar
situation: cooperation and normative convergence at the
global level but poor record of mutual understanding
regionally. An ES reading of Central Asia’s attitude in the
UNGA, therefore, allows to consider those norms and in-
stitutions that inform the international relations of Central
Asian states, discloses the perspective that Central Asian
states have on global international society and offers an
alternative view on why, despite their poor record of
regional cooperation and indeed growing competition,
these states havemanaged so far to coexist in their regional
space.
In addition, and not less importantly, the attempt of this
paper to apply an ES reading on Central Asia would expand
a new theoretical agenda that has been inaugurated only
very recently (Costa Buranelli, 2013; Kaczmarska, 2013;
Pourchot & Stivachtis, 2014).
3. Methodology and methods
The next step to make is to determine the right meth-
odology and methods to disclose the hypothesised
normative convergence. In line with an ES approach, I
opted for a qualitative, interpretive analysis of two kinds of
sources (Navari, 2009).
The ﬁrst one are the ofﬁcial documents from 1992 to
2012 retrieved from the UN online archives and web da-
tabases submitted by Central Asian governments, alone or
in common, to the UN, whether to the Secretariat or to the
UNGA directly.
The second one is the whole array of declarations,
speeches, interviews, press-conferences and addresses
made by government representatives within the UN itself,
where the intention to abide by speciﬁc norms and in-
stitutions of international society is advocated by the
speakers (on behalf of the state they represent). Sources of
this kind were available only for the years 2011 and 2012.
Dealing with these two kinds of sources, I coded thoseterms, phrases and expressions that signal, contain or
simply make reference to a speciﬁc norm or institution of
international society.
Yet, in order to substantiate my claims and to
strengthen the validation of the hypotheses set above, I
tried to engage in a triangulation of methods opting for a
multi-method research (Mason, 1996: 25, 42). While the
ﬁrst two groups of sources are scrutinised in a qualitative
way, I have also adopted a quantitative analysis of a third
group of sources, which is the similarity of positions in the
UNGA among nations expressed in votes on a single issue
over time, from 1992 to 2012. To analyse this third group of
sources, I relied on the Index of Afﬁnity of Nations
(Strezhnev & Voeten, 2013a). This index calculates the
similarity of positions among nations within the UNGA,
posing it on a (0–1) scale, where “0” represents the highest
disagreement and where “1” represents the highest
agreement and convergence. The added value of inte-
grating the qualitative strategies adopted in this paper
with this quantitative tool is the possibility to verify that
the normative convergence of Central Asian states is
expressed not just on paper and verbally, but is also
translated in documented outcomes. The multi-
perspective corroboration of the hypotheses was thus
sought via an integrative, multi-faceted methodology
based on interpretivism and descriptive statistical
correlation.
While the use of such a quantitative technique may not
ﬁt well in a paper that claims to follow an ES approach to
sustain its claims, I believe there is nothing that a priori
prevents the mixing of methods to present more nuanced
andmore rounded conclusions (6 & Bellamy, 2011; Greener,
2011). As amatter of facts, while relying onmere qualitative
analysis would prevent me from verifying how this
convergence is played out in the UNGA, the mere quanti-
tative aspect would prevent me from knowing on what
norms there is convergence. This is why I endorse a multi-
method analysis to disclose possible normative isonomy
among Central Asian states in the UNGA. With respect to
the last, quantitative part, it should be noted that contrary
to Ferdinand (2013) I employ only one index of conver-
gence, and not three. This is because this paper does not
intend to be a quantitative analysis of voting convergence.
Rather, one of its aims is to show a perhaps less precise but
more rounded picture of normative convergence among
Central Asian states, and therefore deems appropriate to be
methodologically extensive and not intensive. In addition, I
am aware that the use of these different methods does not
provide a perfect picture of the normative convergence of
Central Asian states within the UNGA, and some problems
are still left out. These problems, however, will be dealt
with in the conclusion, and will certainly (and hopefully)
represent opportunities for further research.
4. Structure of the paper
The paper is structured as follows: in the ﬁrst section, I
will scrutinise and analyse the norms endorsed and sup-
ported in the ofﬁcial documents submitted to the UNGA by
Central Asian states as a group. Therefore, in this section I
will also focus on the “regionness” of Central Asia, meant as
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states capable of acting in concert and presenting a com-
mon identity to the world. This section, in sum, will offer a
collective overview on their normative convergence. In the
second section, conversely, I will offer a discrete overview of
their normative convergence. I will code declarations and
speeches of each Central Asian state-representative to see
what norms are adopted and embraced by singular leaders.
As it can be expected, the hypotheses listed above will be
validated if both the collective and the discrete overview
will bring the same results. In the third section, I make a
quantitative shift, and I will discuss the normative
convergence of Central Asian states in voting sessions in the
UNGA to verify if this convergence is also sustained at the
decisional level. In the conclusions, I will discuss the ﬁnd-
ings of the research and the position of Central Asia in the
global international society, as well as the value that an ES
approach can add to the study of international politics in
Central Asia.5. Normative convergence in UN Documents
submitted by Central Asian countries
The ﬁrst examples of normative convergence and soci-
etal attitude among the ﬁve Central Asian states date back
to the mid-1990s and the end of that period, when the
Central Asian Union was still alive (1994–1998).7 Despite
the already noted neglect of the wide literature on the
matter, that period and that experience proved to be sig-
niﬁcant in terms of deﬁning and sharpening the normative
directions of Central Asia in world politics.
For example, in the document “Towards a Culture of
Peace” (A/52/558 31st October, 1997), the ﬁve Central Asian
governments presented a roadmap of how international
relations should be conducted. References to multicultur-
alism and pluralism (x 6. “We are unanimously of the view
that mankind’s cultural diversity is an essential prerequi-
site for the maintenance of alternative paths to the further
development of mankind” and x 13. “The meaning of civi-
lization is multiculturalism. This is the only acceptable and
realistic idea of the present and the future. The cultures of
small peoples are equal and irreproducible in their unique
distinctiveness and the multiplicity of their hues”), sover-
eign equality (x 7. “to devise a newworld order inwhich, on
the basis of equality of rights and mutual respect, account
would be taken of the interests of all peoples”), interna-
tional law and diplomacy (Annex II: “The development of
bilateral inter-State relations on the basis of the norms of
international law has become a guarantee of the successful
conduct of [our] policy”) were endorsed and reiterated.7 The Central Asian Union was an international organisation set up by
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan aiming at creating an integrated
market and a common economic space. The organisation had an inter-
committee of Presidents, one of Prime Ministers and one of Foreign
Ministers. In addition, it had its own bank (the Central Asian Bank) and
even its monthly publication, “Central Asia: Problems of Integration”.
However, disagreements on payment methods, tariffs and duties slowed
down integration consistently. In 1998, the organisation was renamed
Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) and included Tajikistan as
well.One year later, in the A/53/62 Document, the ﬁve
Central Asian states reafﬁrmed their normative conver-
gence on the world stage professing strongly pluralist
values and norms. For example, the values and institutions
of sovereignty, non-interference, international law and
diplomatic resolution of conﬂicts take a whole paragraph
of the document:
“Reafﬁrming their commitment to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, desiring to deepen the ties
among their countries and peoples on the basis of the
principles of respect for independence, sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, inviolability of borders, equality, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, rejection of
the use of force or threat of force and rejection of economic
or any other means of exerting pressure, conscientious
fulﬁlment of their obligations, and compliance with the
universally recognized norms of international law”.
At the same time, the institution of Great Powers
management is evident in the ﬁve states’ assessment of the
Afghan peaceful settlement: “[the sides] reafﬁrmed their
readiness to continue their joint efforts to settle the situa-
tion in Afghanistan under the auspices of the United Na-
tions, with the participation of neighbouring countries, the
Russian Federation and the United States of America”. In
addition, the regional identity of Central Asia8 was
entrench and enhanced, signalling that all regional states
adhered to those norms and principles:
“the leaders of the ﬁve States noted their States’ enor-
mous historical potential and common historical roots,
the interrelatedness of their destinies, their traditions of
friendship, the similarity of their cultures, customs and
mores, and the stability of their good-neighbourly re-
lations”; “Bearing in mind the similarity of their goals
and objectives with respect to the independent devel-
opment of their countries, consolidation of their state-
hood, and their international recognition as full subjects
of international law”; “The sides unanimously noted the
usefulness and timeliness of the Ashgabat meeting,
which helped strengthen mutual understanding and
conﬁdence, and clarify positions on key issues con-
cerning relations among the ﬁve fraternal countries”
Interestingly, however, application of the pluralist
values of sovereignty equality, non-interference and coex-
istence are to be found in the region itself, especially when
stressing
“their determination to consolidate their political and
economic independence [and] their unwavering
commitment to deepening friendly, equitable and
mutually advantageous relations based on a long-term
partnership and consistent with the national interests
of all ﬁve States, and to security and stability in the
region”.8 Already one year earlier Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov stated that
“We [Uzbeks] continue to believe that Central Asia has its own charac-
teristics; he also made reference to a “regional identity”, although he did
not explain what he meant (A/51/PV.21).
9 After joining CACO in 2004, Russia merged CACO with EurAsEc
(Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) at the St. Petersburg Summit of 2005, de
facto silencing the only Central Asian regional organisation then still alive.
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from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Na-
tions), which followed the Tashkent Declaration signed on
March 26, 1998, the parties emphasised once more the
values of sovereignty and non-interference (“They regard
the integration of the States of Central Asia as a natural and
objective process which is conditioned and determined by
the vital interests of each country”), of international law as
the main and indeed only mean of communication among
nations (exempliﬁed by the long list of agreements made,
“To ensure the strict implementation of the joint agree-
ments adopted”) plus the common references to peaceful
coexistence and fraternal ties (which would imply a
commitment to diplomacy when dealing with potential
interstate conﬂicts and disagreements). Also in this case,
the construction and the perpetuation of a concrete
regional coherence are visible:
“On the basis of the common history and culture of their
peoples, the Heads of State of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan andUzbekistan.”; “They regard the integration
of the States of Central Asia as a natural and objective
process”; “[the parties] emphasize that they would also
welcome the participation of Turkmenistan in a form
acceptable to it”; “The Presidents declare theirﬁrm resolve
to do everything possible to strengthen eternal friendship
and cooperation between the peoples of Central Asia,
which are in conformity with their vital interests”.
Already from this short analysis of principles endorsed
by Central Asian states, it is notable the interrelation be-
tween norms and regional context, as well as between
norms and regional identity: in the words and minds of
State leaders, Central Asia was a coherent, convergent and
distinct region of world politics.
The trend of normative and regional convergence did
not stop with new millennium, but actually received more
impetus with the setting up of the Central Asian Coopera-
tion Organization (CACO) (2002–2005). In the document A/
57/614–S/2002/1246 (Letter dated 14th November 2002
from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Na-
tions), for example, we ﬁnd a clear common commitment
to the preservation and implementation of pluralist values
in international relations within the region: Central Asian
states are said to be
“Guided by their common interest in promoting the
stability, security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of
all the States of the region and in strengthening coop-
eration between the States of the region in areas of
common interest”.
At x 5 we ﬁnd a renewed commitment to the norm of
environmentalism:
“The Heads of State emphasize the need for increased
cooperation in the area of the protection and enhance-
ment of the environment, the prevention of trans-
boundary pollution, and the prevention of natural and
technogenic disasters in the States of the region and the
elimination of their consequences”,paired with the intention to abide by the prescriptions
and dictates of international law:
“[the States] reafﬁrm the need for coordinated and
concerted action in that area on the basis of the gener-
ally recognized principles and rules of international
law”.
As in other documents, however, the use and validity of
international law is reinforced by that of protection of
borders and sovereignty, x 7:
“The Heads of State emphasized the importance of the
speedy completion, on the basis of the rules and prin-
ciples of international law, of the process of the legal
establishment of the State border lines between their
States as a basic element of the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of States”.
Such principles are also recalled in the Dushanbe
Declaration, annexed to the document itself. There, we ﬁnd
also support for the rules of diplomacy and coexistence in
interstate relations: “taking into account the interests of all
the countries of the region and in compliance with the
principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect”.
Regional coherence is also reafﬁrmed: the signatories
present themselves as “The Presidents of the States of
Central Asia d the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the
Republic of Uzbekistan”.
In 2003, the Joint statement by the heads of State of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the
Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan was
submitted to the UNGA and the Secretariat (A/58/131–S/
2003/703). Again, the usual pluralist norms of coexis-
tence, limited and short-termed cooperation and respect
for sovereignty and international law are professed, while
clearly identifying themselves as a region. As a matter of
fact, the Heads of State addressed “the questions of
developing multilateral regional cooperation within the
framework of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization
(CACO), the situation in and around the region”, thus
creating a divide between them, Central Asians, and the
external realm. Indeed, one should never forget that the
fact that these documents were submitted to the UN
were also an attempt to gain international recognition as
a group.
Towards the end of the ﬁrst decade of the new millen-
nium, however, the ﬁve Central Asian states lost any sense
of regional grouping, being without a Central Asian
regional organisation representing them. In parallel with
the entry of Russia in the region,9 pristine animosities
especially on border issues, water and energy resources, old
divides and mutual distrust among the leaders of the re-
publics prevented them to present themselves on theworld
stage as “Central Asia” as we saw above. Nonetheless, while
the regional convergence decreased in centripetal form,
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normative bulk of the region, has remained present.
Especially in the ﬁeld of security and nuclear non-
proliferation, the Central Asian states have been success-
ful in using the UN as a rostrum from where they could
prove to be able to successfully bargaining matters related
to their survival, even proposing themselves as an example
for other regions to the world. The formal setting up for the
Central Asian NuclearWeapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) started
already in 1997. In the Statement issued at Tashkent on 15
September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, then submitted to the UN (A/52/390), the
states agreed to sign a treaty instituting the CANWFZ,
following their common commitment to sovereign
equality, use of diplomacy and international law as means
for peaceful coexistence and stressing those rules facili-
tating security maintenance and survival among nations.
The process of setting up the CANWFZ lasted more than 10
years (2005: A/59/733–S/2005/155; 2009: A/63/782, 2012:
A/67/409). The UN noticed the normative convergence of
the Central Asian states in the realm of non-proliferation,
declaring that the Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia, on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
States of the region, constitutes an important step towards
strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and
ensuring regional and international peace and security (A/
67/409).
Thus, even at a time when Central Asian countries were
not supported by (and, perhaps more importantly, decided
to not support any more) regional projects speciﬁcally
“Central Asian”, these states have been able to ﬁnd an
agreement and to meet each other’s interests following the
pluralist norms of coexistence exempliﬁed by sovereignty
protection, international law and diplomacy.106. Speeches and norms
This section addresses the norms professed by each
Central Asian state in the UNGA in the last two years via
direct speech. As we have noted, there are no Central Asian
regional organisations any more, and therefore each Cen-
tral Asian state on the stage speaks only for itself and not on
behalf of the regional group. However, the analysis shows
that while the regional convergence has lowered signiﬁ-
cantly, the normative convergence has remained high.
Methodologically speaking, I will rely on the ten speeches
made at the UNGA Plenary Meeting by the ﬁve Central
Asian representatives in 2011 and 2012.10 In the Press Conference on CANWFZ Treaty, March 30, 2009 Monday
(States News Service), Nurbek Jeenbaev (Kyrgyzstan) stated that the ﬁve
countries had reached their agreement out of a desire to promote
regional and international peace and security; Aksoltan T. Ataeva
(Turkmenistan) said that, while each of the ﬁve nations had its own
identity, they also shared a common history, and Murad Askarov (Uzbe-
kistan) added that the signing and quick entry into force of the Treaty was
also a clear indication that all ﬁve countries were fully aware of their role
in maintaining international security and contributing to a more stable
world.Starting with the 67th General Debate in the UNGA, 27
September 2012, the ﬁrst speaker was Kairat Umarov for
Kazakhstan (Umarov, 2012). In his speech he emphasised
Kazakhstan’s commitment to security, reform of the UN
System (“multipolarity.trust and political tolerance”), no-
nuclear weapons (“Kazakhstan fully supports the proposal
by the United Nations Secretary-General to adopt a nuclear
weapons convention”), international law and diplomacy
(“new principles.should be enshrined in.the entire in-
ternational law system; we call upon the Governments to
adhere to their international obligations to protect diplo-
matic representatives in their countries”), non-interference
(“we believe that it is fundamentally important to ensure
strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in
international affairs of States”). Other norms and in-
stitutions mentioned were sovereignty (“The principles of
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs must
be respected”) and environmentalism (“Kazakhstan will
actively promote the development of a project of sustain-
able development goals”).
The second speaker was Asylbek Jeenbekov, represent-
ing the Kyrgyz Republic (Jeenbekov, 2012). In his speech, he
made reference to the following norms: the respect and
inviolability of international law (asking for “commitment
to international legal obligations” in international re-
lations), more equitable order, diplomacy (“we also reject
the use of force against diplomats of every country”), non-
intervention (“Kyrgyzstan is advocating an open interna-
tional dialogue between the forces [in Syria]”), Great
Powers management. Furthermore, there were references
to reform of the UN (“Reform of the UN is still a priority”),
sovereignty (“One can clearly see the sanctity of our
fatherland”) andmore equitable and democratic order (“we
propose to expand the membership of the UNSC to make it
more representative, transparent and democratic”), envi-
ronmentalism (“Kyrgyzstan made its choice of its future
route towards long term sustainable green development
and green economy”).
Then it was the turn of the Tajik representative, Ham-
rokhon Zariﬁ (Zariﬁ, 2012). We read about the importance
of the UN (“it is impossible to address global and regional
issues without strengthening the central role of the UN”),
reform of its system (“it is necessary to carry out a rational
reform of the Organisation”), sovereignty, pluralism
(“Tajikistan is convinced that respect for cultural and reli-
gious diversity.is essential for global peace and under-
standing”), non-interference, international law (“it is
necessary to behave according to international treaties.”),
environmentalism (“in Tajikistan special attention is given
to effective, rational and protective use of natural resources
that constitute the main dimension of the ‘green econ-
omy’”). In addition there were references to norms of good
neighbourhood, diplomacy, pacta sunt servanda (“we
expect.parties in the region will abstain from hasty and
not thoroughly thought out statements and actions that
can run counter to the existing international agreements
and spirit of friendship, cooperation and good
neighbourhood”).
The Turkmen representative, Rashid Meredov
(Meredov, 2012), made reference to environmentalism
(“The UN Conference on Sustainable Development “Rio
11 All these references to Central Asia as a region show how despite the
fact that Central Asia lost its “actorness” (as a regional group) it still exists
in the mind of regional statesmen as a ﬁeld of closely interdependent
relations. This was conﬁrmed to me in more than 30 interviews with
experts, analysts, academics and diplomats that I conducted in Uzbeki-
stan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan between October and December 2013.
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consolidate efforts on ecological issues and environmental
protection”), international law (“Turkmenistan seeks to act
in accordance with international law and the resolutions of
the General Assembly”).
Finally, the Uzbek speaker Abdulaziz Kamilov (Kamilov,
2012) followed on the same lines on non-intervention and
sovereignty (“The problems of Central Asia must be
addressed by the countries of the region without interfer-
ence of external powers”), international law (“We are
deeply convinced that al issues and energy problematic in
our region.must be considered in line with universally
recognized norms of international law; Uzbekistan calls on
to be guided by these principles and norms”) and a pluralist
vision of world order (“Uzbekistan proceeds from
addressing all outstanding political, economic and ecolog-
ical problems of the region on the basis of mutual consid-
eration of interests, constructive dialogue and norms of
international law”).
Moving now to 2011, we see that some of the pro-
tagonists have changed, but again the discourses of State
representatives are not different from 2012.
This time, the Kazakh speaker was the president
himself, Nurusultan Nazarbayev (Nazarbayev, 2011).
Norms endorsed were non-proliferation (“We have
become one of the world’s ﬁrst newly independent non-
nuclear states”), environmentalism (“Kazakhstan has
called for the adoption of a Global Energy and Environ-
ment Strategy and has put forward an ambitious ‘Green
Bridge’ environmental initiative”), sovereignty, non-
intervention and international law (“[t]oday, the princi-
ple of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity is
often exposed to erosion. This could undermine trust
between nations. Today, it is essential to upgrade the
norms of international law concerning the national sov-
ereignty of States”).
For the Kyrgyz Republic, the speaker was Roza Otun-
bayeva (Otunbayeva, 2011): she professed the values of
democracy, which she considered a Kyrgyz peculiarity,
but also those the norms international law, non-
intervention (“external intervention should remain a
measure of the last resort and be used only and exclu-
sively with the sanction of the UN Security Council”),
diplomacy, environmentalism (“Kyrgyzstan is concerned
with the decline of the world community’s attention to
the issues of global climate change”), non-proliferation as
foundational norm of the region (“Kyrgyzstan as one of
the initiators of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in
Central Asia and as the depositary of this treaty, which
entered into force on 21 March 2009, considers important
the promptest entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and strengthening of the uni-
versality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”), plus
references to Central Asia as a region, sovereignty,
pluralist world order passim.
The speaker for Tajikistan was, again, Zariﬁ (Zariﬁ,
2011): he supported the institutions of diplomacy, sov-
ereignty, market economy (“We believe that the system
of international trade must remain open, fair, based on
agreed upon rules, predictable and non discriminatory.
Guided by these principles, Tajikistan is currently holdingnegotiations on joining the World Trade Organization
(WTO)”), environmentalism (“It is widely known that in
the second half of the 20th century the Central Asian
region faced a severe ecological crisis that is degradation
of the Aral Sea. It was irrational, careless and irrespon-
sible use of the natural resources that caused actual
death of the Aral Sea”), references to Central Asia as a
region (“My country ﬁrmly supports a mine free zone in
the Central Asian region”), international law, Great
Powers management, reform of the UN for a more equi-
table order (“It is impossible to address global issues and
most urgent regional tasks without strengthening the UN
system”).
Another presidential ﬁgure present at the General
Debate was Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov for
Turkmenistan (Berdymukhamedov, 2011). In one of his rare
appearances on the world stage, he endorsed the norms of
diplomacy (“Turkmenistan attaches paramount impor-
tance to the regulation of any situations by peaceful means
and methods”), de-institutionalisation of war (“we abso-
lutely reject military forces as an instrument of foreign
policy and intergovernmental relations”), plus a declaration
on priority introduction of political and diplomatic tools in
solving international issues, references to Central Asia as a
region (he advanced the proposal for an Advisory Council
on peaceful development in Central Asia), reform of the
economic order, environmentalism (“The environmental
sphere is the priority direction of international cooperation
of Turkmenistan”).
The last speaker was the Uzbek Foreign Minister Elyor
Ganiev (Ganiev, 2011). He supported the norms of a social
market economy (“The ‘Uzbekmodel’ of democratization of
the country and transition to socially oriented market
economy adopted in the early years of our independence
served as a basis of these achievements”), sovereignty (“In
all 20 years passed since the time when the Republic of
Uzbekistan became an independent state and joined the
ranks of full-ﬂedged members of the United Nations”),
reference to Central Asia as a region (“the tragic events in
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 became a serious challenge to
peace and stability in the Central Asian region”),11 diplo-
macy (“there is no military solution to the Afghan prob-
lem”), non-interference (“It is our ﬁrm belief that the
Afghan people must resolve their country’s problems on
their own”), environmentalism (“the socio-economic
development not only of our country but the entire Cen-
tral Asian region is inﬂuenced by the environmental
disaster of the Aral Sea”), international law (“any action on
using the resources of transboundary rivers must take into
account the interests of all states located in their basin and
on the basis of international law”; “the position of our
country not only fully goes in line with the international
law and the rules in this area [water], but not least, comes
out of them”), multilateralism (at least at the global level)
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the multilateral mechanisms to ensure a stable and just
world order”) .
What does all this reveal? Bringing together the various
declarations of Central Asian state representatives made
from the UNGA rostrum, it is possible to have a preliminary
map, although partial and imperfect, of their normative
orientation in world politics. They all endorse all those
norms and rules associated with a pluralist account of in-
ternational society (sovereignty, non-interference, inter-
national law, diplomacy).
In addition, speaking in ES terms, they all seem to
advocate the institution of Great Powers management,
although sometimes this poses difﬁculties in matching it
with the norm of non-intervention (as the case of Uzbe-
kistan exempliﬁes). While all of them endorse, in
different degrees, the principles of the market economy,
only Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan make explicit
reference to them. However, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan are mildly referring to them as well in the conduct of
international relations (note that both states have
engaged with the WTO with respect to their future entry,
although at different paces. While Uzbekistan has
recently slowed down the whole accession process,
Turkmenistan has recently set up a commission to study
possible accession).
Furthermore, all Central Asian states adopt a multi-
cultural, pluralist and democratic vision of global order,
rejecting the supremacy of the more developed countries
at the expenses of the poorer ones, both in terms of re-
sources and representation in institutional forums. Last
but not least, all Central Asian states seem to endorse the
principle of multilateralism in solving global issue,
although this can be also seen as a derivative of their
vision of international society as a pluralist environment.
Unilateralism is explicitly rejected, and the role of the UN
in ensuring multilateral arrangements in the security,
economic and environmental ﬁelds is constantly stressed.
Thus, even if Central Asian states do not present them-
selves as a regional actor any more, they show a sub-
stantive degree of normative convergence, in some cases a
real symmetry. The question to ask now is: is this
normative convergence empirically observable in the
UNGA?13 Referring to votes on Human Rights, Boockmann and Dreher refer to
the “expressive nature” of voting in the UNGA as opposed to an
“instrumental” one (2011: 462).
14 An instrumental adoption of a norm, however, can be seen as a
normative commitment as well. The only thing that differs from a “heart-7. Votes and convergence
This third and last section seeks to discover whether the
normative convergence analysed and contextualised above
is reﬂected in the voting practice in the UNGA. Before
presenting the data, however, I need to specify some con-
ditions, not last the method I use.
Firstly, I make clear that I look at those resolutions that
1) require a vote12 and 2) do not concern the12 Following Ferdinand (2013: 3), I do not consider resolutions adopted
by consensus. This, however, is a very (methodologically speaking) sen-
sitive issue in scholarship on UNGA voting. For a comprehensive analysis
of the problem of “consensus voting” in the UNGA, see Häge and Hug
(2013).organisational structure of the UN, but actually concern
issues of world politics such as questions about sover-
eignty, nuclear weapons, economic order, environmental
issues, peaceful settlements of conﬂicts, human rights and
so forth.
Secondly, I consider each vote in the GA as a support/
rejection for the norm and/or institution embodied in the
resolution under debate. Although this move has been
endorsed in the literature (Keohane, 1967; Peterson, 1986,
more recently Boockmann & Dreher, 2011; Puchala, 2005;
Voeten, 2012),13 it may still require an explanation. There
is a reason to believe that a vote can be linked to a
normative stance especially given that 1) states are aware
of the one-head-one-vote rule, and therefore are not tied to
regional or global hegemons, and 2) most of the votes have
not binding nature. Given that resolutions are not binding,
therefore, states are more inclined to vote for what they
deem to be right rather than for what they think it may be
useful.14
We should also clarify the method adopted. As antici-
pated, I use the UNGA Voting Dataset, which contains also
the Afﬁnity of Nations scores (Strezhnev & Voeten,
2013a).15 To calculate the degree of convergence among
Central Asian countries in the UNGA, I have used the vari-
able “agree3un” – Voting similarity index using the interval
(0–1) – computed using three categories of vote data
(1 ¼ “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 ¼ abstain, 3 ¼ “no” or
disapproval for an issue).16 Abstention, therefore, is coun-
ted as half-agreement with a “yes” or “no” vote (Strezhnev
& Voeten, 2013b). I considered the “agree3un” variable
since 1992 (ﬁrst date available) and computed it for each
dyad of Central Asian countries (10 dyads) and then
calculated the mathematical average value for each dyad
over the years. Detailed voting convergence data are in the
appendix (see Appendix); however, in what follows I focus
on the most striking similarities between the Central Asian
countries.
Two possible objections may be made to this analysis.
Firstly, one may argue that the normative convergence
among Central Asian states is meaningless because they
may share a high degree of convergence with other coun-
tries as well (see, e.g., Stavridis & Pruett, 1996: 4). Clearly
Central Asian states share many concerns of their post-
colonial fellows in world politics (Ayoob, 1995), and this
is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that these states
are sympathetic with the demands and normative stances
of the Non-AlignedMovement (of which Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan are members and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan andfelt” adoption of a norm is the level of “depth” of internalisation, and
therefore the likelihood/probability of infringement in the future (Buzan,
2004).
15 The dataset is available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/
faces/study/StudyPage.xhtmlglobalId¼hdl:1902.1/12379.
16 I follow Boockmann and Dreher (2011) in maintaining “abstention”
and “vote against” separated.
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at the beginning of the paper, when it was stressed that
given the present-day literature on the centrifugal char-
acter of the Central Asian region it was necessary to focus
on the region itself to have more room for problem-
atisation. We should not forget that the focus of this paper
is speciﬁcally on the ﬁve Central Asian republics and on
their convergence at the international level. The fact that
Central Asian states share a high degree of normative
convergence with other states does not go against the fact
that Central Asian states share a high degree of normative
convergence among themselves, and this is particularly
important since, as noted, they are usually considered in
the literature as incapable of agreeing on anything.
Secondly, there is the question of Great Powers. They
may inﬂuence Central Asian states’ votes. Towhat extent do
Central Asian states show normative convergence with
Russia and China, for example? On the utility of this
question, the previous answermay still work. However, it is
interesting to see that, while the data for China have not be
computed yet, dyads with Russia show a statistically lower
degree of agreement for all the ﬁve republics. Clearly we
are in the realm of agreement and convergence, but ﬁgures
are lower than among Central Asian states sometimes with
signiﬁcant (low) peaks (see Appendix). Task for future
research, however, would be for example to understand
and show on what issues the Central Asian republics and
the former patron disagree the most (sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity seem to be good candidates, as well as
nuclear matters).18
All dyads of Central Asian states show a high degree of
convergence, with the highest value of 0.953 of
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and the lower one of 0.895 of
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is interesting to see how
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, commonly consid-
ered reciprocal foes in the region, have nonetheless quite a
strong record of convergence (0.914 and 0.916 respec-
tively), with indeed a rising trend over the last ﬁve years
(see Appendix).
With respect to Russia, there is convergence as well, but
less than among Central Asian states themselves (see
Appendix). All values are below 0.88 on average, with sig-
niﬁcant low ebbs over the years (0.66 with Turkmenistan in
1996, a 0.70 with Kyrgyzstan in 1994 and a 0.68 with
Uzbekistan in 1997). Perhaps not surprisingly, given their
high dependence onmilitary supply, security provision and
economic investment, the two countries that enjoy the17 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in 1961. Common
objectives of the NAM through the years have been: 1. south–south
cooperation; 2. territorial integrity and respect of sovereignty; 3. reform
of the UN system; 4. sustainable development; 5. multilateralisation in
response to US uni-polarity; 6. cultural diversity and differentiation of
human rights. In addition, the Central Asian states share the so called
“Shanghai Spirit” promoted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), characterised by highly pluralist norms (Ambrosio, 2008;
Lanteigne, 2006). However, common positions at the UN within the
SCO framework have never been discussed, since as said Central Asian
states rely much more on bilateralism when it comes to coordinate po-
sitions within international organisations.
18 For example, on issues concerning recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, all ﬁve Central Asian states voted exactly the opposite of Russia.highest afﬁnity with Russia are Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
(0.86 and 0.87 respectively).
Going back to common voting behaviour among Central
Asian states, recent examples of unanimity are to be found
on equitable development (A/67/455); sovereignty and
auto-determination (A/67/456; A/61/442; A/67/444), mat-
ters concerning globalisation and cultural diversity (A/67/
457/Add.2; A/66/462/Add.2); unilateral coercive measures
in case of infringement of human rights (A/67/457/Add.2);
right to development (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/Add.2);
equitable international order (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/
ADD.2; A/66/462/Add.2); security and nuclear matters (A/
67/406; A/67/409) thus in line with the analysis conducted
on the other two groups of sources. A thorough analysis of
the precise issues on which there is unanimity, however,
has yet to be done.
8. Findings and conclusions
In this paper, I have tried to set out four hypotheses.
Here, I discuss their validity. An accurate, scrutinised
analysis of speeches, documents and voting convergence in
the UNGA has revealed that the ﬁve Central Asian republics
endorse the same norms and agree on a number of them.
Referring often to environmental problems, security-
related issues, possible ethnic clashes and fearing domi-
nation from the Great Powers, they support strong pluralist
norms and values of international relations: territorial
integrity, Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty, reliance
on international law and diplomacy as the sole modes of
conﬂict resolution, an equitable global economic order, plus
a common solidarist concern on the environment.
The very interesting preliminary ﬁnding of this paper is
that while at the regional level there is seldom meeting of
minds, at the international level the ﬁve republics speak
the same language, and abide by the same institutions. This
seems to be in line with what other senior scholars have
said on the region, namely the presence of a Central Asian
“club” (Cummings, 2002: 11) or of a “Central Asian stan-
dard” (Cooley, 2012: 151). Thus, the ﬁrst two hypotheses
seem to be correct. A task for future research will be that of
bringing to the surface the reasons for this regional–global
divide Central Asian states, as well as possibly enhancing
the arguments made in the paper with additional ﬁeldwork
data and even more interviews with protagonists.
However, the ﬁndings do not suggest in any way that
there is something speciﬁc to the way that Central Asian
states conduct their international relations. Rather, the
paper has showed how Central Asian states have adopted
and endorsed the most common pluralist norms of inter-
national society, thus favouring a world order based on the
values on peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation. It
should be noted that the emphasis of the paper was on
cooperation among Central Asian states at the international
level, and therefore on their normative convergence, not on
their normative distinctiveness as a group.
In addition, the UN has been called upon by Central
Asian countries several times to back and arrange regional
cooperative arrangements, as it was the case of the Inter-
national Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the CANWFZ. The
common appeal to the UN has been made possible by a
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stability and survival, and their common interest in pre-
serving their sovereignty, statehood and territorial integ-
rity has stimulated cooperation at the international level.19
Also the third hypothesis is, therefore, defensible.
The fourth hypothesis seems to be the weakest one. In
the analysis presented above there is hardly something
that can lead to think that there is a distinct, identiﬁable
Central Asian identity, meant as a set of political, norma-
tive and cultural features that distinguish this region form
others. It may have been the case during the 1990s, where
environmental problems inherited from the USSR, the
ethnic split among the republics, their new entry in the
global market economy and their “autocratic solidarity” to
counter instability and regional conﬂagration were voiced
at every international occasion as special features of the
region. Common references to “Central Asia” in the UN
documents discussed above prove this. After 2001, how-
ever, the trend is that of a region which is still perhaps
existent in terms of a weak regional security complex
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003, see also Bayzakova, 2010;
Burnashev & Chernykh, 2013), but not as a coherent
group of states that are linked by normative or political
peculiarities, and certainly not by a common identity. As
we noted, there is still a great deal of convergence on
numerous issues, but this convergence is not framed in a
“regional narrative” any more. This ﬁnding is quite an
important one, since it departs from the conclusions
drawn by Ferdinand on the ASEAN case, claiming that
“[vote similarity in the UNGA] suggest[s] a coherent
regional identity on the global stage” (2013: 14). Dis-
proving the hypothesis made in the introduction, the
analysis above has showed how among Central Asian
states there is strong convergence on several pluralist
norms of international society, but this convergence is not
imbued with “regionness”. Notably, this ﬁnding comes
from the multi-method adopted in the paper: having
looked not also at the quantity of the normative conver-
gence, but also at its quality, I was able to describe how the
normative convergence was played out by the actors,
whether alone or in group.
Where from here? This paper did not intend to
describe Central Asian states as highly cooperative.
Converging voting patterns “do not necessarily mean
comprehensively close foreign relations, still less coordi-
nated political action” (Ferdinand, 2013: 16; see also
Alker & Russett, 1967: 60; Bailey et al., 2013: 30–31).
Rather, this paper has made a case for considering voting
behaviour and behaviour in general in the UNGA as an
indicator of the pluralist, defensive normative position of
the Central Asian states, thus shedding light on their
sociability as actors in international society and value-19 The UN has also been recently involved in another regional dispute,
that over the Roghun dam. While Tajikistan favours the construction of
the dam as it would generate electricity for its own domestic consump-
tion, thus avoiding dependence on neighbouring countries, Uzbekistan
strongly opposes it, as it would impact on its agricultural production. The
two parties, after a long series of disputes and hostile acts, have agreed to
defer the controversy to the World Bank, whose technical report is ex-
pected to be released in early 2014.laden position in it. An ES reading of their position in
the UNGA has revealed that these states agree on com-
mon norms and rules typical of a pluralist international
society, and that despite their disagreement and compe-
tition in the region they endorse similar positions at the
international level. Even if in relative conﬂict with each
other, Central Asian states have managed to live together
for the last twenty-two years advocating, adopting and
implementing those international norms and rules that
guarantee survival, peaceful coexistence and common
life.20 The main aim of this paper was indeed to focus on
the international cooperation, or rather, dialogue, be-
tween Central Asian states, “for it is a reality and it is a
constant and under-considered element in foreign policy-
making. It establishes parameters for cooperation inside
as well as outside the region. It can counterbalance the
nationalist excesses. It shows that there is more common
ground on broad foreign policy between the states in
[Central Asia], and therefore the basis for closer potential
cooperation, than accounts of the territorial disputes
usually allow” (Ferdinand, 2013: 16).
Therefore, Western policy-makers and diplomats
engaging with Central Asian states should take this values
and normative orientations as basis for their political pre-
scriptions for regional actors. This is especially true if the
neo-patrimonial nature of their governments is taken into
consideration as well (Collins, 2009: 277).
Their pluralist normative stance, as explained and illus-
trated by the ﬁndings, is the product of the recent birth of
these states, of their precarious position in a challenging
regional environment and of their historical, economic and
political legacies. If cooperation among Central Asian states
is achievable, then it is likely to be effective only if based on
the norms and institutions discussed in this paper, and itwill
be, at least in its initial manifestations, short-termed, prag-
matic and on speciﬁc issues. The value of the ES approach
adopted in this paper has been exactly that of shedding light
on this via media between pure competition and pure
cooperation, which have been the most common lenses of
analysis to study international relations in Central Asia.
In a world that is speaking increasingly different lan-
guages, especially when it comes to principles, norms and
rules, to map and understand what states think is appro-
priate in international relations may be a useful point of
departure to preserve order and predictability in an
increasingly fragmented international society. And even if
they are not as fashionable as Great Powers are, Central
Asian states are no exception.
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Voeten, 2013a). The variable considered has been
“agree3un” – Voting similarity index using the interval (0–
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approval for an issue; 2 ¼ abstain, 3 ¼ “no” or disapproval
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“agree3un” variable since 1992 (ﬁrst date available) and
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dyads) and then calculated the mathematical average value
for each dyad. Not all years were available. Also, dyads with
Russia and each of the Central Asian republics have been
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